CAB148-30-Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Meetings Relating to 1967 Disturbances-1967 — Page 36

SECRET

Page 36

*

Consultation since then with the United Kingdom representative in NATO had led to an amendment of this proposal in the sense that it would be more acceptable if we appeared to accept an offer of such advice from NATO than ourselves to originate the proposal.

THE DEFENCE SECRETARY said that while there had as yet been no exacerbation of personal feelings between our forces and the Maltese the situation was dangerous and such administrative measures as cutting off supplies of water could very quickly make our whole position untenable. It was also possible that a general strike night be called on the

following Monday. It would be possible to evacuate our forces, despite

our inability to import fuel without paying duty, by use of the

Britannias and he proposed to bring to a shorter period of notice the

specialist Service personnel who were already, under an existing

contingency plan, earmarked to go to Malta to provide administrative

support for the forces if local labour were withdrawn. It would not at

this stage, however, be appropriate to meet the request of the

Commander-in-Chief, Malta to alert the battalion which was earmarked

for reinforcing Malta for purposes of internal security.

In those circumstances the proposal to accept advice from NATO

in the manner now suggested offered the best prospect of reducing

tension. Meanwhile, the Law Officers had advised that we could, without unacceptable legal consequences for our acceptance of the abrogation of the Defence Agreement, pay the customs duties on imports

for our forces which were being demanded by the Maltese Government

contrary to the provisions of the Agreement. The Cabinet had given

authority for these duties to be paid if the Law Officers advised in

SANSE this ea, but in the circumstances now obtaining it would be preferable

to defer paying the duties until it could be seen whether

Dr. Borg Olivier would accept our proposal.

In discussion it was argued that the acceptance of advice by NATO

on our ability to implement our commitments under the Defence Agreement

would be to place the freedom of action of the Government seriously at

risk, not only in Malta, but in other overseas theatres where we proposed

to effect reductions in the level of our forces. The precedent which

the proposal would have created could effectively be used elsewhere to

delay or even frustrate reductions which we might think essential in our

own interest. Even if the proposal could in relation to Malta so be circunscribed as to entail no real risk to our position there, the

(97792)

Page 36

--2-

SECRET

Page 36